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September 28, 2002

Western Imperialism's Greatest Accomplishment

At the risk of eliciting a complaint from the author (who I really don't think would mind), I will now quote extensively from an amazing book by Thomas Sowell:

After lasting for thousands of years, [it] was destroyed over most of the planet in a period of about one century, and over virtually all of the planet within two centuries. The destruction of this ancient and world-wide institution was all the more remarkable because it was accomplished in the face of determined opposition and cunning evasion at every level, from the individual [actors] to the heads of nations and empires. Moreover, the impetus for [its destruction] came not from any of the objective, material, or economic factors so often assumed to be dominant in history, but from a moral revulsion against [it]...

[It] was so deeply entrenched and seemingly impregnable when the...political crusade began...that....any thought that the very institution...itself could be abolished was considered Utopian. Yet the mobilization of public opinion in [the world's greatest power] against [it] produced such powerful and enduring political pressures that successive generations of [their] governments found themselves forced to push the...effort further and further toward its logical conclusion—...finally to pressure, bribe and coerce other nations into abolishing [it] as well.

...

...[O]nce mobilized, this public opinion proved to be so strong, so tenacious, so enduring, and ultimately so irresistible, that the...crusade was swept along beyond its original goals...to abolishing [it]...throughout the world...

...The...movement proved to be as unrelenting as it was widespread. ...[M]issionaries fueled the public's outrage with their reports..., reports widely disseminated by a powerful...lobby in [the capital]. Not all government officials favored the...cause by any means, and some in both the civil and military establishments resented the extra burdens put upon them by this cause, as well as the complications that the...crusade made in...foreign relations. But the political pressures forced successive...governments to continue their worldwide opposition to [it]. ...[I]t became such a factor in [the great power's] domestic politics that candidates for political office felt a need to declare where they stood on the issue. [Eventually, being anti-crusade] was considered a political liability.

[Imperial] warships were sent on patrol..., boarding not only [their own] ships to inspect them..., but also boarding the ships of some other nations who had "voluntarily" granted them this right. [Soon, the great power] began to urge the [largest Muslim state] to abolish [it] within its dominions. The initial response of the...sultan was described by the...ambassador:

I have been heard with extreme astonishment accompanied with a smile at a proposition for destroying an institution closely inter-woven with the frame of society in this country, and intimately connected with the law and with the habits and even the religion of all classes, from the Sultan himself on down to the lowest peasant.
[The great power of the day] was far in advance of most of the rest of the world in its opposition to [it]. However, its example inspired [others]..., and the French government later...sent its navy on patrol...to help...intercept [perpetrators]. Eventually, opposition to [it] would spread throughout Western civilization, even to despotic governments... The European-offshoot societies of the Western Hemisphere all abolished [it] before the end of the...century, and the spread of Western imperialism to Asia and Africa brought [it] under pressure around the world.

Outside of Western civilization, the...effort was opposed and evaded, especially in the Islamic world. Repeated pressure on the [largest Muslim state] led its government to decree a ban [on its practice] within its dominions..., even though this ban led—as expected—to discontent and revolt among...subjects. However, mindful of the opposition within, [Muslim] authorities were not very active at trying to stamp out the [practice]. Eventually, the [great power] threatened to begin boarding [the Muslim state's] ships..., unless the [Muslims] themselves began enforcing the ban... Nor was the [largest Muslim state] the only foreign government to feel the pressure of [the imperialist] policy. [Later], ...warships anchored off [an island nation] and threatened to blockade the island unless the [unwanted activities] closed down. [They] closed.

A sharp distinction is apparent between the ending of [it] in Western civilization and in non-Western regions. By [late in the century, it] had been abolished throughout the Western Hemisphere. yet the struggle to end [it]...continued on into the [next] century in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The [great power] added naval patrols in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf after the [largest Muslim state's] formal ban...provided legal cover for such interventions. Yet [it] continued on land until after European imperialism took control of most of the [region]. Only then could the attempt be made to stamp [it out completely.] The difference between the Western and non-Western worlds as regards the ending of [it is]...epitomized in the words used to describe the process—...in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East...it was a more protracted process that lasted well into the [next] century.

Even after Western hegemony extended into many nations of Asia, Africa and the Middle East, [it] continued in remote regions... Among the Islamic nations of North Africa and the Middle East, the abolition of [it] came especially late, with Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, and the Sudan continuing to [support its practice] on past the middle of the [next] century. Mauritania officially abolished [it]—though its own officials admitted that the practice continued after the ban.

Non-Western societies never developed the crusading zeal which led to the destruction of [it] wherever [Western] power extended. Nevertheless, the national stigma of [it] eventually became a factor in the [curtailing] or abolition of [it] in non-Western countries which did not wish to appear backward or uncivilized. ... The rise of nationalism among [some] countries in general gave an impetus to the effort to stamp [it out], in order to gain respect from the world's leading nations, which meant Western nations. In the Philippines, at the beginning of the [next] century, an American report on the continuation of [it] there was seen by Filipino leaders as a blow against their efforts to gain independence. Even within the Islamic world, which retained the institution...longest, Westernized elites began to oppose [it], whether out of conviction or out of embarrassment. In short, [it] was ultimately destroyed morally, though the chief instrument of this destruction was the overwhelming military power of the West, combined with the opinion of Western civilization, based at this juncture in history on its economic, scientific, and technological achievements. Ironically, after anti-Western views became fashionable among Western intellectuals in the late twentieth century, desperate expedients of rhetoric were resorted to, in order to depict the destruction of [the evil practice] by European civilization as somehow serving the economic interests of [Western] powers.


My lame attempts to "neuter" the subject matter aside, the above is, of course, a description of the near-worldwide abolition of slavery. Of course, slavery is practiced today in the Sudan and is preached approvingly in Mosques and on television programs in a number of Arab states, still. The Islamist treatment of women, for that matter, essentially amounts to slavery as well, with a number of American-born women, just to take an example, currently trapped in Saudi Arabia because Saudi law forbids them to travel without the permission of their husbands.

My point?

I've always thought that "wars on X" were silly. You can't normally make war against poverty, or drugs, or illiteracy. To claim otherwise implies an odd understanding of what "war" really means. So the characterizing of the current conflict as "the war on terrorism" has always made me uncomfortable. Yet I've remained quiet in my criticisms exactly because of the example set by imperial Britain in its war against slavery.

Slavery is an institution that has been practiced continually by every culture and civilization since before recorded history. It is not unique to the Western hemisphere, nor were Africans the sole victims by any stretch of the imagination. Two hundred years ago, most societies across the globe took slavery for granted as something that always was, and always would be.

The deliberate terrorization of enemy civilian populations for politcal means has been around at least since Sparta, and most likely since the dawn of time. At times it has been considered "against the rules of war" among Western states, but no thinking person has ever really believed that it was unusual or truly stoppable.

Only by the application of overwhelming economic and military force, coupled with the moral demands of free citizens, could slavery ever have been wiped out to the degree that it was. Perhaps, some day, the Western world will truly fall and we will see a reemergence of slavery. I doubt it, though, for with the spread of Western power has gone the infectious spread of Western ideas of liberty and personal sovereignty.

Today, we are (half-heartedly, it sometimes seems) setting off on a similar Herculean task that will also require the vigilant application of overwhelming military, economic and moral force. If we succeed, then I have little concern that academicians in the late twenty-second century will attribute our motivations entirely to convoluted desires for Afghan oil. Just so long as we succeed.

I'm quite upbeat on the short-term prospects and more tactical requirements of our current conflict. I have a vision of something much larger, though, and I'm not certain it will come to pass.

Terrorism is practiced because (a) it works, (b) it's possible, and (c) it's cheap. There is nothing at all we can do about (a). Becoming a police state at home and constantly spying on and interdicting individual terrorist organizations abroad will have, in the end, only a limited effect on (b). The leg of the tripod to strike at is (c). If the cost of supporting terrorism is so great that no state can contemplate using or supporting it for any end whatsoever, then terrorism can be defeated. Bin Laden's Al Qaida is not powerful because of his personal wealth. By all accounts, the overall expenditures on his monstrous creation far exceeded his own net worth long ago. Al Qaida and other global terrorist organizations—and terror groups of even just regional reach—are able to conduct operations and, in fact, to continue to exist at all because of the financial and material support provided to them by states and by the citizens of complacent states.

Tonight, Henry Kissinger noted that the issue of topping Saddam Hussein and the larger War on Terrorism were inextricably linked. He said that right now many states, particularly those in the Middle East, see terrorist movements as a greater threat to their power than the United States. As long as that continues, they will always turn a blind eye toward domestic groups that support terrorism, and often directly support terrorist groups themselves. Until the United States demonstrates its willingness to overthrow governments that actively or passively support terrorism, diplomatically, economically or militarily, then such a condition will continue.

Many who argue against toppling Saddam worry that it won't stop there. It's an excellent thing to worry about. Though he never outright said it, Kissinger implied that toppling Saddam would be sufficient to alter the cost analysis for the various states most terrorists get their support out of. Such may not be the case, though, and I, too, worry about where we will go next. Such worry, though, doesn't stop me from supporting the first step, nor even the next—unseeable—step. I just don't see a better alternative.

In the first post-Cold War decade, a number of great minds (Kissinger, Huntingdon, et al.) all started saying the same thing: America must not squander its temporary power on unilateral crusades nor withdraw into an isolationist fantasy. I, however, don't think most Americans really deep down inside like how much power we have. So exhortations to nurse and protect and carefully maintain our political, ideological, technological, economic and military hegemony are, in the end, useless to me. Power and influence, like fame and fortune, have no intrinsic value. Money, energy—whatever—are totally worthless apart from what they are applied to.

If applying American Hegemony to the abolition of terrorism results in a final depletion of our international power capital reserves, so to speak, then I think I can live with that. Being careful, playing nice multilateral diplo-games may preserve American leadership for a century or two, but why lead if there is nowhere to lead to? Choosing to take this cause all the way to its own logical conclusion could very well end American hegemony within fifty years. Again, so long as we are successful, so be it. Someone else will take up the mantle of leadership after we recede from great power status.

I hope its Australia.